A TICKING TIME BOMB
COUNTERTERRORISM LESSONS FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S
FAILURE TO PREVENT THE FORT HOOD ATTACK
U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Washington D.C. 20510
February 2011
This the executive summary
On November 5, 2009, a lone attacker strode into the deployment center at Fort Hood,
Texas. Moments later, 13 Department of Defense (DoD) employees were dead and another 32 were wounded in the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil since September I I, 200 I .
The U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmenta l Affairs launched
an investigation of the events preceding the attack wi th two purposes: (I) to assess the
informat ion that the U.S. Government possessed prior to the attack and the actions that it took or failed to take in response to that infonnation; and (2) to ident ify steps necessary to protect the United States against future acts of terrorism by homegrown violent Islami st extremists. This investigation flows from the Committee's four-year, bipartisan review of the threat of violent Islamist extremism to our home land wh ich has included numerous bri efings, hearings, consultations, and the publicat ion of a staff report in 2008 concerning the internet and terrorism.
In our investiga tion of the Fort Hood attack, we have been cogn izant of the record of
success by 000 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the ten years since 9/ 11. We recognize that detection and interdiction of lone wol f terrori sts is one of the most difficult
challenges facing our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Every day, these agencies are presented wi th myriad leads that require the exercise of sound j udgment to determine which to pursue and which to close out. Leaders must allocate their time, attention, and inherently limited resources on the highest priori ty cases. In addit ion, the individua l accused of the Fort Hood attack, Army Major Nidal Ma lik Hasan, is a U.S. citizen. Even where there is evidence that a U.S. cit izen may be radicalizing, the Constitution appropriately limits the act ions that government can take.
In present ing our findings and recommendations below, we are gratefu l for the service
given by our nation 's mili tary, law enforcement, and intelligence personnel. Our aim in this
investigati on was not to single out individua l negli gent judgment; such instances are for the
agenc ies to deal with, as appropriate. Nor do we seek to second-guess reasonable judgments.
Instead, we act under our Const itutional duty to oversee the Executive Branch's pcrfonnance and thus to detennine - independently from the Executive Branch's own assessment - what, ifany, systemic issues are exposed by the Hasan case. The specific facts uncovered by the Committee's investigation necessarily led us to focus our key findings and recommendations on 000 and the FBI. But the Hasan case also evidences the need for a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to counterradicalization and homegrown terrorism across a ll agencies, including federal, state, and local entities, wh ich are critical to keeping our country safe.
Our basic conclusion is as follows: Although neither 000 nor the FBI had specific
informat ion concerning the time, place, or nature of the attack, they collecti vely had suffic ient
information to have detected Hasan's radica lization to violent Islamist extremism but failed both to understand and to act on it. Our investigat ion found specific and systemic fai lures in the government's handling of the Hasan case and raises additional concerns about what may be
broader systemic issues.
Both the FBI and 000 possessed information indicating Hasan's radicalization to violent
Islamist extremism. And, to the FBI's credit, it fl agged Hasan from among the chaff of
intell igence coll ection for additional scrutiny. However, the FBI and DoD together fai led to
recogni ze and to link the information that they possessed about Hasan: ( I ) Hasan was a military officer who li ved under a regimented system with strict officership and security standards, standards which his behavior during his military medical training violated; and (2) the
government had [REDACTED] communicat ions from Hasan to a suspected terrorist,
[REDACTED], who was in volved in ant iwAmerican acti vities and the subject of an unrel ated FBI terrorism in vestigation. Thi s individual will be referred to as the "Suspected Terrori st" in this report. I Although both the public and the private signs of Hasan's radicalizat ion to violent Islami st extremi sm while on acti ve duty were known to government official s, a string of failures
prevented these officials from intervening against him pri or to the attack.
• Evidence of Hasan's radicali zati on to violent Islamist extremism was on full display to
hi s superiors and coll eagues during his military medical training. An instructor and a
coll eague each referred to Hasan as a "ticking time bomb." Not only was no action taken
to di scipline or di scharge him, but al so his Officer Evaluation Report s sanitized hi s
obsession wi th violent Islamist extremism into praiseworthy research on
counterterrorism.
• FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTfFs) are units in FBI field offices that conduct
counterterrori sm investigations and are staffed by FBI agents and employees from other
federa l, state, and local agencies. A JTTF learned that Hasan was communicating with
the Suspected Terrori st, flagged Hasan's initial [REDACTED] communicat ions for
further review, and passed them to a second JTTF for an inquiry. However, the ensuing
inquiry fai led to identi fy the totality of Hasan's communications and to inform Hasan's
mi li tary chain of command and Army security officials of the fact that he was
communicating with a suspected violent Islamist extremi st - a shocking course of
conduct for a U.S. mi li tary officer. Instead, the JTTF inquiry relied on Hasan's erroneous
Officer Evaluation Reports and ult imately dismissed his communi cat ions as legitimate
research.
• The JTTF that had reviewed the initial [REDACTED] communications di smi ssed the
second JTTF's work as "slim" but eventually dropped the matter rather than cause a
bureaucratic confrontation. The JTTFs now even dispute the extent to which they were
in contact with each other in this case. Nonetheless, the JTTFs never raised the dispute to
FBI headquarters for resolution, and entit ies in FBI headquarters responsibl e for
coordination among fi eld offices never acted. As a result, the FBI's inquiry into Hasan
ended premature!y.
As noted, DoD possessed compelling evidence that Hasan embraced views so extreme
that it should have discipl ined him or discharged him from the military, but DoD failed to take
action against him. Indeed, a number of poli cies on commanders' authori ty, extremism, and
1 The redact ions in this report were requi red by the Intelligence Community pursuant to Executive Branch classifical ion policies and are the result of intensive negotiations spanning three months. We take issue with the extent of these redact ions, some of wh ich we believe are unjustified, but we have consented to them in order to produce this report in a timely manner.
personnel gave supervisors in his chain of command the authority to take such actions. It is clear from this failure that 000 lacks the institutional culture, through updated policies and training, sufficient to inform commanders and all levels of service members how to identify radicalization to violent Islamist extremism and to dist inguish th is ideology from the peaceful practice of Islam.
To address this failure, the Department of Defense shou ld confront the threat of
radicali zati on to violent Islami st extremism among servicemembers explicitly and direct ly and strengthen associated policies and training. 000 launched an extensive internal review after the Fort Hood attack by commissioning a review led by two former senior DOD officials (former Army Secretary Togo West and ret ired Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark) and requiring multiple reviews across the Military Services of force protection and related issues.
DOD has also inst ituted a regimented process for instituting and monitoring implementation of recommendat ions from these reviews, which included two memoranda from Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates assessing and adopting particular recommendations from the West/Clark review. However, 0 00 - including Secretary Gates's memoranda - still has not speci fically named the threat represented by the Fort Hood attack as what it is: violent Islami st extremism.
Instead, DoD's approach subsumes thi s threat within workplace violence or undefined "violent
extremism" more generall y. DoD's failure to identify the threat of violent Islamist extremism
expl ici tl y and directly confli cts with DoD's hi story of directl y confronting white supremacism
and other threatening activity among servicemembers. DoD should revise its poli cies and
training in order to confront the threat of violent Islamist extremism directly.
More specifically, DoD should update its policies on extremism and religious
accommodat ion to ensure tha t violent Islamist extremism is not tolerated. DOD should also train servicemembers on violent Islami st extremi sm and how it differs from Islamic religious belief and practices. Without this improved guidance and training, the behavioral tendency among superiors could be to avoid proper appli cat ion of the current general policies to situat ions involving violent Islami st extremism.
The 9/11 attacks led the FBI Director, Robert Mueller, to act to trans rorm the FBI's 11
institut ional and operational architecture. He declared that the FBI's top priority would
henceforth be preventing domestic terrorist attacks and that the FBI needed to become an
in elligcnce~ce tric rather than purely law~enforcement~ cen tr ic organizati on. The FBI has made substantial progress in transforming itself in these ways. The FBI is more focused on producing counterterrorism intell igence and more integrated than it had been. Its init iat ives are headed in the right direction. To its credit, the FBI moved swiftly after the Fort Hood attack to conduct an internal review, identify gaps, and implement changes in response; the FBI also commissioned an outside review by former FBI Director and Director of Central Intelligence Judge William Webster. Nonetheless, our in vestigation finds that the Fort Hood attack is an indicator that the current status of the FBI's transformation to become intelligence-driven is incomplete and that the FBI faces internal challenges - which may include cultural barriers - that can frustrate the on-going institutional rerorms. The FBI needs to acce lerate its transformation.
• In the Hasan case, two JTTFs (each located in a different fi eld office) disputed the
significance of Hasan' s communications wi th the Suspected Terrori st and how vigorously
he should be in vesti gated. The JTTF that was less concerned about Hasan controlled the
inq ui ry and ended it prematurely after an insufficient examinat ion. Two key
headquarters units - the Counterterrori sm Division, the "National JTTF" (which was
created specificall y to be the hub among JTTFs), and the Directorate of Intelligence -
were not made aware of the dispute. This unresolved conflict ra ises concerns that,
despi te the more assertive role that FBI headquarters now plays, especially since 9/ 11 in
what historically has been a decentralized organization, field offi ces still prize and protect
their autonomy from headquarters. FBl headquarters also does not have a written plan
that articulates the divis ion of labor and hierarchy of command-and-control authoriti es
among its headquarters units, fi eld offices, and the JTTFs. This issue must be addressed
to ensure that headquarters establishes more effective strategic control of its fi eld offi ce
operations.
• In the Hasan case, the FBI did not effectively ut ilize intelligence analysts who could have
provided a different perspective given the evidence that it had. The FBI 's inquiry
focused narrowly on whether Hasan was engaged in terrorist activity - as opposed to
whether he was radicalizing to violent Islarn ist extremism and whether this radicalization
might pose counterintelligence or other threats (e.g., Hasan might spy for the Taliban if
he was de ployed to Afghanistan). This cri tica l mistake may have been avoided if
intell igence analysts were appropriately engaged in the inqui ry. Since 9/1 1, the FBI has
increased its inte lligence focus by creat ing a Di rectorate of Intelligence and Field
Intell igence Groups in the field offices and hi ring thousands of new and better qualified
analysts. However, the FBI must ensure that these ana lysts are effecti vely uti lized,
including that they ach ieve significant stature in the FBI. The FBI must also ensure that
all of its agents and ana lysts are trained to understand violent Islamist extremism.
• In the Hasan case, the FBI did not ident ify the need to update its tradecraft (i.e., the
methods and processes for conducting investigative or intell igence acti vities) regarding
the process ing and analys is of communi cations (REDACTED] unti l aft er the Fort Hood
attack. This de lay led to a failure to identify all of Hasan 's communicati ons with the
Suspected Terrorist and the extent of the threat contained wi thin them. The FBI has had
numerous successes aga inst homegrown terrorist cells and individuals since 911 1 that
have saved count less American lives. However, the FBI should still ensure that all of its
tradecraft is systemicall y examined so that flaws can be corrected prior to failures. The
FBI leadership should continue to oversee this element of its transformat ion to a fi rst·
class, intell igence.driven counterterrorism organi zation.
• In the Hasan case, the JTfF model did not live up to the FBI' s strong vision of JTTFs as
an effective interagenc), information-shari ng and operational coordination mechanism.
JTTFs have been expanded signi ficant ly since 9111 and are now the principal domestic
federal opera tional arm for counterterrorism investigat ions and intelligence coll ect ion.
They perfonn criticall y important homeland securi ty funct ions and have produced
numerous successes in disrupting and apprehending potenti al lerrorists. However, the
specific handli ng of the Hasan case, and systemic disputes between DoD and the FBI
concerning JITFs which remain unreso lved, rai se concerns that the JITF model requires
additional revi ew and improvement in order for JTTFs to function as effectively as our
nation requires.
We ask that DoD and the FBI review and respond to the concerns identified in this report
on an urgent basis.
Finall y, we request thaL the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council
lead in the development of an integrated approach to law enforcement and intell igence
domestica ll y and a comprehensive national approach to countering homegrown radicalization to violent Islamist extremism. The threat of homegrown radicalization goes beyond the
capabilities of the law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security agencies and requires a response from a broad range of our government which will produce plans to translate and implement this comprehensive national approach into specific, coordinated, and measurable act ions across the government and in cooperati on with the Muslim-American community.
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