The Colombia free trade pact is bad policy
- 07/30/10 11:06 AM ET
Earlier this month, President Obama stated that he would push forward the Colombia Free Trade Agreement, along with those of Panama and South Korea, “as soon as possible.” This announcement came amid a concerted White House effort to appear more pro-business and was touted as an important step to fulfilling the president’s promise to double exports within five years.
It is hard to know whether the administration is serious about pushing the Colombia FTA or just posturing. Let’s hope the latter is true. Bringing up the agreement, which is strongly opposed by the AFL-CIO and other unions, would trigger an intra-party battle among Democrats over trade. And even if the White House prevailed, it would be a pyrrhic victory. The Colombia trade pact is plain bad policy. The deal would reward egregious labor and human rights violations, bring minimal benefits to the U.S. economy, and have destabilizing impacts on Colombia — which will be paid for by American taxpayers in the form of U.S. aid.
First, Colombia is infamously known as the most dangerous country in the world for unionists, but less well-known are the series of scandals that plagued Uribe’s tenure, including widespread party connections between Uribe’s close advisers and relatives to "demilitarized" paramilitaries, illegal wire-tapping of human and labor rights activists by DAS, the Colombian equivalent of the CIA, and the "falsos positivos" scandals in which the military murdered over 2,000 civilians and then dressed them as guerrillas to claim progress in Colombia’s internal war.
None of this may change with incoming president Juan Manuel Santos, Uribe’s handpicked successor who assumes power on Aug. 7, 2010. As former minister of defense and a closely held member of Uribe’s party, Santos’s proximity to these scandals means he will not take office with a clean slate, but must earn support by respecting human and labor rights as well as the independence of Colombia’s courts. The FTA is a big carrot the U.S. holds to push reform in Colombia, and it may be needed to make Santos prove what Uribe could not: that he can boost security while respecting human and labor rights.
Second, the small positive effects of the Colombia FTA on the U.S. economy may well be completely offset by the destabilizing impacts it will have on Colombia, for which American taxpayers will pay in the form of aid to Colombia.
In their June 2 letter, 39 members of Congress state that "further delay risks sacrificing the entire Colombian market to U.S. competitors." In reality, that "entire" market will represent (about two decades down the line after full implementation of the FTA) less than a 0.05 percent increase in U.S. gross domestic product, and the International Trade Commission predicts that the FTA will have "minimal or no effect on output or employment for most sectors in the U.S. economy."
While the Colombia FTA would likely confer few benefits on U.S. workers, its effect on Colombian workers would be severely negative. In particular, the FTA would be devastating to rural agricultural laborers, who constitute 20 percent of the country’s employment, provide 40 percent of its domestic food consumptionand generate 8 percent of Colombia’s GDP. By tearing down barriers to U.S. agricultural products, the FTA would put Colombia’s farmers in competition with giant U.S. agri-business firms subsidized by tax dollars. It is widely expected that thousands of rural workers would be displaced as cheap U.S. farm products — particularly rice, corn and beans — flood Colombia. Oxfam Colombia estimates that at least 15,000 rural jobs will be lost and small farmers’ incomes, which average less than $3.90 per day, will be reduced by almost half.
This means that the FTA is not just a bad deal for Colombia’s workers, but also for U.S. taxpayers — who would not only pay to subsidize U.S. agricultural products exported to Colombia, but would also foot the bill for increased security aid to Colombia (already a hefty $7.9 billion since 1996) when the displaced farmers turn to coca production or paramilitary employment to survive, perpetuating Colombia’s bloody civil war.
Rather than supporting an ally, passage of the FTA may actually increase instability in Colombia.
The FTA should be kept on ice until President-elect Santos can prove that he is more than just Uribe’s protégé; he must improve respect for human and labor rights in Colombia. The U.S. should also insist that Santos shows that he has a plan to offset the destabilizing impacts of the FTA. Only when these conditions are met should Congress give the deal with Colombia another look.
Lauren Damme is a policy adviser to the International Program at Demos, a New York-based think tank.
It is hard to know whether the administration is serious about pushing the Colombia FTA or just posturing. Let’s hope the latter is true. Bringing up the agreement, which is strongly opposed by the AFL-CIO and other unions, would trigger an intra-party battle among Democrats over trade. And even if the White House prevailed, it would be a pyrrhic victory. The Colombia trade pact is plain bad policy. The deal would reward egregious labor and human rights violations, bring minimal benefits to the U.S. economy, and have destabilizing impacts on Colombia — which will be paid for by American taxpayers in the form of U.S. aid.
First, Colombia is infamously known as the most dangerous country in the world for unionists, but less well-known are the series of scandals that plagued Uribe’s tenure, including widespread party connections between Uribe’s close advisers and relatives to "demilitarized" paramilitaries, illegal wire-tapping of human and labor rights activists by DAS, the Colombian equivalent of the CIA, and the "falsos positivos" scandals in which the military murdered over 2,000 civilians and then dressed them as guerrillas to claim progress in Colombia’s internal war.
None of this may change with incoming president Juan Manuel Santos, Uribe’s handpicked successor who assumes power on Aug. 7, 2010. As former minister of defense and a closely held member of Uribe’s party, Santos’s proximity to these scandals means he will not take office with a clean slate, but must earn support by respecting human and labor rights as well as the independence of Colombia’s courts. The FTA is a big carrot the U.S. holds to push reform in Colombia, and it may be needed to make Santos prove what Uribe could not: that he can boost security while respecting human and labor rights.
Second, the small positive effects of the Colombia FTA on the U.S. economy may well be completely offset by the destabilizing impacts it will have on Colombia, for which American taxpayers will pay in the form of aid to Colombia.
In their June 2 letter, 39 members of Congress state that "further delay risks sacrificing the entire Colombian market to U.S. competitors." In reality, that "entire" market will represent (about two decades down the line after full implementation of the FTA) less than a 0.05 percent increase in U.S. gross domestic product, and the International Trade Commission predicts that the FTA will have "minimal or no effect on output or employment for most sectors in the U.S. economy."
While the Colombia FTA would likely confer few benefits on U.S. workers, its effect on Colombian workers would be severely negative. In particular, the FTA would be devastating to rural agricultural laborers, who constitute 20 percent of the country’s employment, provide 40 percent of its domestic food consumptionand generate 8 percent of Colombia’s GDP. By tearing down barriers to U.S. agricultural products, the FTA would put Colombia’s farmers in competition with giant U.S. agri-business firms subsidized by tax dollars. It is widely expected that thousands of rural workers would be displaced as cheap U.S. farm products — particularly rice, corn and beans — flood Colombia. Oxfam Colombia estimates that at least 15,000 rural jobs will be lost and small farmers’ incomes, which average less than $3.90 per day, will be reduced by almost half.
This means that the FTA is not just a bad deal for Colombia’s workers, but also for U.S. taxpayers — who would not only pay to subsidize U.S. agricultural products exported to Colombia, but would also foot the bill for increased security aid to Colombia (already a hefty $7.9 billion since 1996) when the displaced farmers turn to coca production or paramilitary employment to survive, perpetuating Colombia’s bloody civil war.
Rather than supporting an ally, passage of the FTA may actually increase instability in Colombia.
The FTA should be kept on ice until President-elect Santos can prove that he is more than just Uribe’s protégé; he must improve respect for human and labor rights in Colombia. The U.S. should also insist that Santos shows that he has a plan to offset the destabilizing impacts of the FTA. Only when these conditions are met should Congress give the deal with Colombia another look.
Lauren Damme is a policy adviser to the International Program at Demos, a New York-based think tank.
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